Naavi.org

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

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The petitions from the Scrap DPDPA Brigade in Supreme Court refers to DPDPA 2023 and the Rules as not being in conformity with  the famous K S Puttaswamy Judgement of the Supreme Court of 24th August 2017.  (KSP judgement)

The essence of the decision in the case of KSP was that

“Privacy is a fundamental Right under the constitution and is part of  Article 21 of the Constitution subject to the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). “

The bench however did not define Privacy nor gave any restrictive boundaries to the Right to privacy whether it is restricted to Information Privacy. It however extensively noted the risks related in information privacy. In its directions, it stopped at stating that the Right is part of the fundamental Rights and parts of M P Sharma judgment and Kharaksingh judgement  are over ruled.

The KSP judgement  did not further gave any order to the Government to pass any statutory law to protect the Privacy Rights of Indian population. Hence the statement of the petitioners in the Reorter’s Collective Trust that “DPDPA Act and Rules are in complete conravention of the law laid down in the KSP judgement” is incorrect.

Before this judgement was out, the Government had already formed the Justice Srikrishna Committee which went on to give its report in 2018 which after several iterations became DPDPA 2023.

DPDPA 2023 was under no obligation to define “What is Privacy” and “How the Government Protects Privacy”. Hence the Government chose to restrict the law as “Law for protecting the personal data” and went on to define personal data.

Privacy in India is therefore protected by the Constitution directly and DPDPA 2023 facilitates the Data Principal to protect his privacy by protecting his personal data with the deterrance mentioned in DPDPA 2023.

The Government also adopted a strategy different from GDPR and laws of other countries by designating the entity determining the purpose and means of processing of personal data as a “Data Fiduciary” placing on them the onus of understanding what the data principal wants and carry out  his permissions. Hence Consent was the backbone of the law.

Since Article 19(2) prescribed the reaasonable exceptions, Government also recognized “Legitimate Uses” under Section 7 and Exemptions under Section 17. Both Sections 7 and 17 are applicable to both the Government and the Private Sector. Some of the exemptions are partial exemptions. Legitimate use is conditional.

The only blanket exemption is related to some of the aspects of the Article 19(2).  Even here, all exemptions available under Article 19(2) have been invoked. Government has been very conservative.  Also 17(2) is applicable to only such instrumentalities of State which are notified. Unless an entity is notified, the exemptions are not applicable even for the approved purposes such as the interests of soereignity and integrity of India etc

To call this provision as “Attempt for Mass Surveillance”,, “Excessive”, “Disproportionate” etc… is false.

The Call for scrapping of DPDPA is atrocious. DPDPA tries to make Data Fiduciaries responsible and not indulge in indiscriminate harvesting of personal data, use it for spamming, profiling etc. The industry is interested in monetizing the  personal data of individuals without a fair compensation to the data principals.

DPDPA is expected to put an end to the obnoxious practice of Corproates stealing personal data without proper consent and enriching by their use. While DPDPA may not fully prevent the woes of the public from being targetted with Spams, Use of darak patterns to manipulate purchase decisions, use of techniques to change the freedom of mental decision making through mind bending communciation strategies, it has given a hope to public that things may move in that direction.

The penalties at levels of Rs 250 crores are one of the higehst in India but are no where near the international norms at 4% of global turnover to 10% of national trurnover etc. The penalty structure under DPDPA does not mandate either Rs 50 crores or Rs 250 crores. It leaves the discretion to DPB to determine the  penalty taking into account the capacity of the data fiduciary to pay. There is also a voluntary undertaking provision where penalty can be waived.

Without properly reading the law the petitioners make unsubstantiated statements including that  journalists cannot pay the fine of Rs 250 crores and  hence the law is unconstitutional.

This is an attempt to misrepresent the law.

The petitioners seem to place “Journalists” as if they are above law. Journalism has a public purpose and today most of the journalists are not the committed journalists of the yesteryear. They are underinfluence of money bags and politicians. Hence giving an unfettered freedom to them is a danger to the society.

Remember, Even Hindenberg can claim to be a “Research organization” as much as any other journalist.

Journalists who are also lawyers are persons who normally use RTI information for purposes other than public good. Even the NGOs they represent are often funded by international orgnaisations and protect the interests of their foreign  bosses more than Indian public.

We therefore seriously question the credibility of the petitioners who ought to declare their sources of revenue.

Bar Association also has to ensure that members of the Bar donot claim to be “Registered Journalists” and  claim the benefits of the so called “Freedom of Speech” etc. This is a disguised attack on the society.

The NGOs headed by lawyers who say they are representing public interest should not be allowed by the Supreme Court to file PIL without proper scrutiny.

I wish the Supreme Court prevents the gross abuse of the PIL privilege used as a weapon against progress.

Lawyers are considered as officers of the Court but we wonder  if they are more officers of vested interests  often guided by commercial or politial considerations using the Court as a play ground for meeting their objectives outside the Court.

Otherwise it does not make sense for any of the petitioners to ask for scrapping of DPDPA just to  ask for some exemptions for the profession of their clients.

The petitions  filed should therefore not  be considered as PILs. They are petitions filed on behalf of the clients like an association of journalists or an association of RTI activists.

The real public advocacy champions are not capable of matching the expenditure required to fight their passions in the Supreme Court and have to  often remain in the background. The Court should recognize this and bring such organizations forward and listen to their advice.

The concers related to Section 44(3) or 17(2)(b) are easily addressable in the rules and have already been addressed. The petitioners donot want to see through the provisions with an open mind and are ascribing motives to every word in the Act and the Rules without justification.

It is our desire that the honourable Supreme Court does not allow such pseudo public interest champions misleading the Court through their oratory and professional standing.

Naavi

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

The petitioners who are challenging DPDPA in Supreme Court have  one specific demand  that they should be provided exemption from the provisions of DPDPA.

If we go through the petition of the Reporter’s Collective, it provides an elaborate argument why the Act should be scrapped because it does not provide exemption to journalists.

The petition however acknowledges that there is exemption for “Research” but it concludes that this does not apply to Journalistic resarch. the petition also acknowledges that the Government  has powers to  exempt any class of data fiduciaries or data from any of the provisions of the Act under Section 17(5) but contends that this cannot be applied to journalists. Hence the only remedy they suggestis  to declare the Act and the Rules as Void. The petitioner has not provided any suggestions on how their concern can be remedied without scrapping the law itself.

The demand is arbitrary and indicates a malicious intention to stop the progressive legislation.

The petitioners try to project GDPR as a reference to state that exemptions for Journalists are adopted in EU. This is an incomplete statement which is meant to mislead the Court.

Article 85 of  GDPR,   states as follows

Article 85: Processing and freedom of expression and information

1. Member States shall by law reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression.
2. For processing carried out for journalistic purposes or the purpose of academic artistic or literary expression, Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from Chapter II (principles), Chapter III (rights of the data subject), Chapter IV (controller and processor), Chapter V (transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations), Chapter VI (independent supervisory authorities), Chapter VII (cooperation and consistency) and Chapter IX (specific data processing situations) if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information.
3. Each Member State shall notify to the Commission the provisions of its law which it has adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 and, without delay, any subsequent amendment law or amendment affecting them.

We should note that GDPR only empowers the member states to follow their own laws related to journalists. As of date, it appears that only the following States have specific laws made in this regard.

• • Austria

  • Belgium

  • Bulgaria

  • Cyprus

  • Czech Republic

This means that there are other 22 States of the EU which have not followed Article 85 of GDPR.

In most countries exemptions are provided on a case to case basis and with certain eligibility criteria such as “Registered Journalists”.

Are the petitioners ready for the Government or DPBmber to introduce a “Registration System”? for Journalists to be exempted from DPDPA?

It would not be a bad idea to introduce a registration system for all “Digital Journalists” who want to be provided a recognition with an exemption from DPDPA.

We remember that Mr Kapil Sibal himself when he was the Minister in the Government of India had suggested that all bloggers should be registered with the Government.

Some time back the MeitY had introduced self regulation of digital media and had proposed online registration of digital publishers.

This system can now be pursued and registered Digital Publishers including Youtube bloggers can be given an option to register as “Ethical Digital Journalists” who will abide by certain rules and can also avail the exemptions fron certain provisions of DPDPA for their journalistic research and publication.

What is required is to add an explanation to the Section  Rule 16 of DPDPA Rules-Nov 13, (Second schedule)  or add an additional rule for Section 17(2)(b) and make it applicable only to registered journalists.

Section 17(2)(b) which states:

The provisions of this Act shall not apply in respect of the processing of personal data—necessary for research, archiving or statistical purposes if the personal data is not to be used to take any decision specific to a Data Principal and such processing is carried on in accordance with such standards as may be prescribed.

Since a journalist does not take any decision about the data principal, his research confined to journalism is already exempted under this section. Whether the research is a fact finding research or an investigative research or a RTI research, as long  as the intention is limited to “Research” this section is a sufficient protection to journalism.

Hence there is no reason to tamper with the law any further.

Naavi

Refer:

(Please refer to the views of Naavi in 2004 on registration of Blog owners)

Kapil Sibal’s views in 2011

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

The petition of Mr Venkatesh Nayak against DPDPA was restrained in praying only for Section 44(3) removal and a few other sections, which we have discussed in detail in the previous series of articles.

In comparison, the petition of  the Reporter’s Collective Trust and Mr Nitin Sethi is conspicuous with its summary demand for declaring the whole of DPDPA 2023 and the whole of the Rules as void.

The demand is ridiculously excessive and indicates no intention of real concern  on public interest but reflects only the anti Government agenda to stop whatever good can happen. It is difficult to understand how petitioners call themselves as supporters of Privacy when they are trying  to dismantle the very law meant to protect privacy.

We all know that no law is perfect. Some times laws need to be explained through the rules and even  amended in a short time. In a complicated law like DPDPA which  seeks to balance multiple rights under the constitution, differences are inevitable and we should learn  to manage them rather than try to scuttle the law  itself.

Wisemen  warn “Don’t Cutoff your nose if you have Cold”.  Unfortunatey the petitioners who want the act to be  scrapped because of some disaagreements have not heard of this proverb.

This petition has highlighted the following concerns/view points that can be contested..

1. Right to Information is  a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) as per earlier Supreme Court judgements.
2. Right to information is essential for carying out the  function of a Journalist and the Act does not provide exemption for journalists.
3. Amendment in Section 44(3) has no legitimate aim under Article 19(2)
4. Proposed amendment interfers with the social audits that a journalist wants to conduct
5. DPDPA applies only to digital information where as RTI applies to all kinds of records and hence DPDPA provision is unreasonable.
6. Disclosure under Section 8(2) of RTI act is discretionary and 8(1)(j) offers a better standard.
7. K S puttaswamy  judgement should not apply to public purpose activities including journalism.
8. Exemption for research under Section 17(2)(b) is not applicable to journalistic reports
9. Section 12 mandates immediate deletion on withdrawal of consent, evidence of a journalistic report may be not available for post facto validation.
10. Whole of the Act and the Rules are void for “Vagueness”.
11. Though Section 17(5) provides for a provision for exemption, Central Government does not have powers to exempt for journalistic purpose.
12. Government calling for information from a data fiduciary is violative of the constitution and gives raise to “Potential for Abuse”.
13. Even when a disclosure of personal information is prejuddicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, it cannot be prevented from being released under RTI.
14. Section 36 enables “Unreasonable data searches” and hence against the Puttaswamy judgement
15. Because the Central Government has a range of less inrusive alternatives including obtaining independent authorization from a Court, there is no need for Section 36.
16. Data Protection Board lacks independence
17. DPB functioning as a digital office is exclusionary.
18. Penalties from Rs 50 crores to Rs 250 crores are exaggeratry.

We appreciate the ingenuity of the petitioners in picking out very many points out of the act and the rules to be objected to,  there are umpteen contradictions within the petition. In some cases they swear by the Puttaswamy judgement and in somce cases they want it to be violated.

The net impression is that this petitioner does not tolerate the existence of the Government itself and does not want  the Government to have any powers of Governance. They respect Puttaswamy judgment but want the Act to be  scrapped. The argument are highly speculative and does not merit even basic consideration.

The only point they make is “Journalism should have some exemptions”. They admit that the act has the power of exemption but still claim that Government does not have the power. The petitioners are confused about what they want and express it  with clarity.

This petition deserves to be rejected with a directive to correct and resubmit making it more specific, avoiding self contradictions.

We will continue our discussions on some of  the individual points and highlight the contradictions.

Naavi

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

Let us now continue on our discussion on the petition of Mr Venkatesh Nayak on Sections 17(1) (c) and 17(2) as well as  33(1) and 36 which are sought to be scrapped.

The petition says that Sections 17(1)(c) and 17(2)(a) and 17(2)(b) empowers “Disproportionate surveillance” by granting sweeping exemptions both to State and Non-State instrumentalities”  without any objective scrutiny or statutory responsibility, under garb of crime preventin. It also alleges that the collection can be indiscriminate and can be used for policing using predictive algorithms. The lack of safeguards is allegedely failing the proportionality test. The petitioner states that there is no legitimate reason to exempt state actors from being bound by statutory obligations under the DPDPA. even for research and statistical purposes.

Let us recall what the two sections state.

Section 17(1)(c):  The provisions of Chapter II, except sub-sections (1) and (5) of section 8, and those of Chapter III and section 16 shall not apply where—personal data is processed in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence or contravention of any law for the time being in force in India;

Section 17(2)

The provisions of this Act shall not apply in respect of the processing of personal data—

(a) by such instrumentality of the State as the Central Government may notify, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order or preventing incitement to any cognizable offence relating to any of these, and the processing by the Central Government of any personal data that such instrumentality may furnish to it; and

(b) necessary for research, archiving or statistical purposes if the personal data is not to be used to take any decision specific to a Data Principal and such processing is carried on in accordance with such standards as may be prescribed.

It appears that the learned counsels have either not read the sections diligently or  trying to mislead the Court with wrong statements.

Section 17(1)

Firstly, Section 17 (1) does not provide “Sweeping powers”. The powers are restricted to exemptions under Chapter II which relate to consent and other obligataions,  Chapter III which relates to Right and Section which relates to Cross border transfer. Even under Chapter II Sections proviions of  8(1) and Sectio 8(5) are not exempted.

Section 8(1) relates to the appointment of a data processor and Section 8(5) relates to protection of personal data.

The petitioner’s concern  that the data collected for law enforcement would be algorithmically analysed to create biases etc is a pure figment of imagination particularly without the processing being done by private sector data processors or joint data fiduciaries.

Further the purpose related to prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence or contravention of any law for the time being in force in India is directly pointing to constitutional exceptions under Article 19(2) which even Justice Puttaswamy Judgement has recognized.  Limited exemptions related to exceptions under Constitutions cannot be called “Sweeping exemptions”. If the petitioner is serious, we can also state that they are making sweeping statements to mislead the Court and implying speculative fears which does not exist.

We should also note that the same exemptions of Chapter II except Section 8(1) and 8(5), Chapter III and Section 16 is also available to many other instances by the private sector including notified startups, during mergers and acquisitions and during recovery of bad debts by financial institutions. Does the petitioner also allege that these private sector agencies also enjoy sweeping powers of surveillance?

It appears that the petitioners have failed to understand the exemptions properly.

Section 17(2)

Now let us turn our attention to Section 17(2) which states

The provisions of this Act shall not apply in respect of the processing of personal data—

(a) by such instrumentality of the State as the Central Government may notify, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order or preventing incitement to any cognizable offence relating to any of these, and the processing by the Central Government of any personal data that such instrumentality may furnish to it; and

(b) necessary for research, archiving or statistical purposes if the personal data is not to be used to take any decision specific to a Data Principal and such processing is carried on in accordance with such standards as may be prescribed.

Have the petitioners observed that for this exemption, the instrumentalities of the State also have to be “Notified”. It does not include all and sundry instruments of state. Further, such instrumentalities of state should be processing data in the interest  of sovereignty and integrity of India etc..which are exceptions under Article 19(2).

Where is the exemption to “Non State Instrumentalities” as mentioned in Ground Y of thepetition (page 30) and where is any definition of a “Non State Instrumentality”?

The objection under Ground Y desrves a summary rejection.

For the purpose of research,archiving or statistical purpose, the exemption is limited to instances where the data is  not used to take any decisions specific to a data principal. Further such data has to be  processed subject to standards that have been prescribed under Rule 5 -second schedule.

Hence under both Sections 17(1) and 17(2) there are enough safeguards to prevent misuse of data collected under these exemptions.

Why Law Enforcement Agencies need a free hand 

I would like to further reiterate, that the statement in page 31 of Venkatesh nayak petition para AA that “There is no legitimate reason to exempt the state actors ” for security purposes is a complete nonsense. It is the duty of a Government to secure the citizens and Right to Security  is a fundamental right of citizens that the Government must protect. There is no right to criminals to use Privacy as an excuse to hide their  activities and for the petitioners to support such criminals by raising objections to laws that help mitigate crime risk to the society.

Hence the grounds for considering Sections 17(1) and 17(2) as unconstitutional is not tenable.

Section 33(1)

Sectin 33(1) states

“If the Board determines on conclusion of an inquiry that breach of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder by a person is significant, it may, after giving the person an opportunity of being heard, impose such monetary penalty specified in the Schedule.”

We donot know what the petitioners want if there is non compliance. Is it wrong for the law to specify a penalty?

Petitioners  harp on the use  of the word “Significant Data Breach”. This actually restricts the powers of the Board that for insignifiant data breaches, Board should not use the penalty provisions indiscriminately.

Naavi.org has suggested methods including the “Valuation of Data” as a measure of the harm caused and  the decision if any is appealable.

Hence the objection deserves summary rejection .

Section 36

Section 36 states

” The Central Government may, for the purposes of this Act, require the Board and any Data Fiduciary or intermediary to furnish such information as it may call for”

Again the petitioners simply speculate that the section is arbitrary. The Central Government is the administrator of the law and would require many types of information both from the Board as well as the Data Fiduciaries.  Claiming that this is “Arbitrary”, “Excessive”, “amenable for abuse”  etc is a play of words that has no relevance to the real concerns of the public.”

In summary the petition lacks genuine grounds for challenging either Section 44(3) or Section 17(1) or 1792) or 33 or 36.

Let us watch further developments in this  regard.

Naavi

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

I refer to the PIL filed in the Supreme Court recently with prayers for scrapping of the DPDPA 2023 as an act and DPDPA Rules.

The petitions are being filed by persons who claim to be representing public interest. However all the past activities of the persons filing the petition are connected to opposing some moves or the other of the Government.

We therefore take objection to them being considered as “Representatives of the Public”. The real public are often no where  in the litigations like these. The Government cannot be considered as the representative of the public in such cases since they are one of the parties who has drafted the law. Hence it is incorrect to leave the entire responsibility of representing the public with the Government.

Some times, the Government will only defend the process of law making and does not have commitment to the cause of the  law. It may enter into compromises with the petitioners either because the peitioner lawyers are more aggressive or because the Government lawyer may not be able to look at the issue from all angles.

Hence it is our desire that no PIL should be taken note of without giving an opportunity for the “Real Public” to particiapte.

In one of the recent cases related to Digital Arrest, Supreme Court had appointed an Amicus Curiae and asked any body who wanted to express views to send it to her/him .

Long time back (around the year 2001), Mumbai high court had taken note of an  article  in naavi.org (case was related to Cyber Cafe regulation and prevention of obscenity) as a public view and published it as part of the Court documents and invited views from public.

We feel that publications in www.naavi.org are to  be considered as public views and even without a formal intervention petition, should be considered as knoweldge to be  incorproated in the trial.

Supreme Court should insist that the Attorney General files an affidavit where he confirms that his views incorproate views published by experts in the field on the Internet which are considered relevant for the case.

While these are suggestions for the Supreme Court for future, at present Naavi has raised a petition under www.change.org with the title” I am the real public in India and I donot support scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA Rules”

We may have many suggestions for resolution of the concerns of the petitioners without scrapping of the law and the rules. Our suggestions may also be directed towards the Government if required which the Government will not consider by its own.

Hence we shall through these columns  in www.naavi.org shall present our views meant to resolve the dispute in “Real Public Interest”.

We hope Supreme Court takes note of our articles here before considering the “Pseudo Public Interest representatives” who  may be present in the  Court  and carry out a high decible campaging with support of vested media interests.

We request readers to support the petition and follow the discussions in these pages which presently rests with the article “Whose Privacy are the Petitioners of DPDPA Challenge Brigade are protecting?“. This discussion will continue and more articles will be placed here for you to respond.

  The petition can be accessed here.

Naavi

(This is a continuation of the discussion on the seeking of scrapping of DPDPA and DPDPA rules by three petitioners in the Supreme Court)

The petitions filed in Supreme  Court against DPDPA 2023 mainly revolves around Section 44(3) and thee conflict with RTI Act. Petition of Mr Venkatesh Nayak restricts its prayer to the declaration of declaringSection 44(3) as Ultravires the Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution.  Additionally it argues that Sections 17(1)(c),17(2) , 33(1) and 36 as well as Rule 23(2) as ultra-vires the constitution.

In this context let us see whose Personal data is at stake in an RTI application. Is it the personal data of the official who was involved in any of the decisions or Is it the personal data of the public whose personal data is sought to be disclosed in the reply.

We also should verify if there are already grounds in RTI act itself where the provision of information can be rejected even before invoking Section 44(3) of DPDPA 2023.

Let us look at the personal information involved of the official. The official is a public servant and once he is appointed for a public post, the information becomes a matter “Made public” and hence is not covered under Section 44(3) of the Act. This is a matter of interpretation of “Personal Data” which should exclude data that is made public as a “Business Contact”. The official’s name and designation is similar to “Business Contact” and hence is outside the scope of DPDPA.

However, the personal information of the beneficiaries of a Government project which is part of the information sought need to be considered as subject to Privacy Rights.

This can be anonymized before release in which case there is no violation of DPDPA.

Hence if the Government considers that no personal information is disclosed under Section 8(1)(j) other than in Anonymized form, the dispute would vanish.

This can be done through a reading down on both 8(1)(j) of RTI act and Sec 44(3) of DPDPA stating that disclosure of information of public during a RTI disclosure shall be consistent with the DPDPA under Section 7(d) and  17(2) (b) .

Under Section 17(2)(b) there is an additional restriction that says that the processing does not include making a decision that affects the data principal. Hence if the objective of the RTI activist is to stop any benefits under any scheme then the affected Data Principals have to be made parties to a legal request of their information and the department has to send notices to all the beneficiaries that a request has been made about their personal data. Since this would in most cases involve a disporportionate effort, the denial of information is justified under Section 8/9 of the RTI act itself.

In protecting the RTI of the activist, Judiciary cannot deny the Right to privacy of persons who are pawns in the dispute between the RTI activist and the Government.  If the petitioners are comfortable with Wection 9 of RTI act which enables disclosure of information which could result in infringement of Copyright, there is no logic why they should be excessively concerned about the amendment to 8(1)(j) which protects the information property rights of a data principal who is a beneficiary of a Government scheme.

What Section 44(3) has done is to remove the burden on the PIO to decide under Section 8(2) of RTI act that “public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.”. This could however be a part of a judicial review and the RTI applicant who is denied information can proceed to challenge the demial in a Court of law.

If necessary, he can appeal on the decision to the CPIO and the State/Central Commission. Hence denial of any information under Section 44(3) amendment does not infringe any right fundamental or otherwise, linked to Article 14,19,21 or otherwise. It only diverts one stream of information which the PIO considers primafacie to infringe on the privacy of a citizen to a higher standard of scrutiny.

As indicated earlier, the above view does not apply to the identity of the officials who are discharging their duties in an official capacity.

If there is any information of the official beyond the identity which can be used for alleging corruption etc., then his own privacy rights should naturally be applicable along with the intention of the  RTI being treated as “llitigation”.

Hence the petition of Mr Venkatesh Nayak and others on Section 44(3) can be resolved with a clarification and reading down of the section that it does not apply to the disclosure of the names of the decision makers but only applies to the information of the public.

We shall discuss 17(1)(c), 17(2), 33(1) and 36 as well as Rule 23(2) separately in our subsequent articles.

We need to debate if we donot have our right to get DPDPA and DPDPA Rules retained in public interest as much as the few petitioners want it to be scrapped. The Supreme Court has to settle once for all how it can decide on the applications of a few advocates claiming to be representing public interest and not involve the larger public to express their objections. Who is representing the “Real Public Interest”  should be considered before entertaining the applications of the select few who always oppose the Government. If the background of the petitioners are checked, it would be clear that they only oppose the Government and it is not clear if their intentions are positive to the Country. The real public interest is therefore not represented by them as much as what Naavi or FDPPI represents.

I recall that in one of the old (around the year 2000) cases in Mumbai High Court on Cyber Cafe regulations, the Mumbai High Court had published an article of Naavi.org (at that time naavi.com) along  with some other information and had invited the public to send their views.  Without any intervention the Court had involved the “Real Public” to particiapte in the decision. Supreme Court should follow similar principles and should not allow the few petitioners to hijak the “Right to Represent the public”.

I am a member of the public and I donot consider the petitioners to be representing my View.

(Please send in your comments if any)

Naavi