P.S: Since some of my comments on EVM made recently had raised some 
  observations from some circles which required an elaboration of my stand, I am 
  providing the following clarifications as a personal opinion as an ordinary 
  citizen of India....Naavi
  
  
  
  Background:
  
  
  I refer to the PIL recently filed in Supreme Court raising objections on the 
  existing EVMs and a prayer that the entire process should be annulled and 
  repeated in Paper Ballot form or re design the EVMs with paper trails and hold 
  the elections using a new machine.
  
  
  While I appreciated the concern of the petitioner that there is a possibility 
  of tampering of the EVMs and this issue needs to be addressed,  it was 
  not possible for me to accept the contention that there was such a wide spread 
  deliberate misuse of the system so as to warrant the cancellation of the 
  elections at a stage when two phases of the poll had already been completed.
  
  
  I therefore suggested that the prayer in the PIL needs to be modified to seek 
  a direction that EC should take up a proper review exercise of its system 
  through an appropriate body of experts soon after the completion of the 
  current election process and not for canceling the election.
  
  
  The Supreme Court has now disposed off the petition and suggested that if the 
  petitioner makes a presentation to the EC, it may consider the suggestions.
  
  
  I welcome this decision of the SC and wish that the petitioners take up the 
  issue with the EC soon after the current election process is over.
  
  
  A Proud Achievement
  
  
   The use of EVMs in Indian election process was a natural development of use of 
  IT in the e-Governance process. There has been lot of hard work and dedication 
  behind the development of the system for which the public sector employees of 
  ECIL and BEL must be given credit for. The very fact that it was possible to 
  use the EVMs in the entire election process of 2004 has bewildered the whole 
  world and raised  comments such as "US can outsource their election 
  process to EC".
The use of EVMs in Indian election process was a natural development of use of 
  IT in the e-Governance process. There has been lot of hard work and dedication 
  behind the development of the system for which the public sector employees of 
  ECIL and BEL must be given credit for. The very fact that it was possible to 
  use the EVMs in the entire election process of 2004 has bewildered the whole 
  world and raised  comments such as "US can outsource their election 
  process to EC". 
  
  
  We as Indians must feel proud of such an achievement.
  
  
  The Criticisms
  
  
  On the other hand some of the critics of the EVMs are today imply that this 
	facilitates and has been used for a large scale rigging of the elections. It 
	is alleged that the machines are mal-configured to record votes wrongly in favour of one candidate over the other. Since this cannot happen except with 
  the connivance of the EC and BEL officials, such an allegation casts serious 
  aspersions on the integrity of the officials involved. 
  
  
  I suppose this is an unfair criticism. 
  
  
  Even though I will be suggesting some modifications in the EVMs, I wish to 
  make it clear that I do not subscribe to the view that the officials of BEL or 
  the EC are deliberately rigging the EVMs. One of the observers called my faith 
  on BEL officials as "Touching". Let me admit that I  do hold a strong 
  opinion that criticising public sector employees  for their integrity is 
  an unhealthy fashion amongst some and I do not fall into this category. I am 
  aware that there are as many if not more bad sheep in the private sector than 
  the public sector. The number of honest persons in the public sector is far 
  more than in the commercial private sector (Excluding the voluntary activists 
  and some NGOs). 
  
  
  With this background about my intentions, let me now state why I consider the 
  current generation of EVMs as "Perhaps not Cyber Law Compliant". These views 
  may be taken as the views expressed for debate and I do not reject any 
  alternate view.
  
  
  ITA-2000 and EVMs
  
  
  Before the passage of ITA-2000, there was no legally accepted object called 
  "Electronic Document" for which certain provisions of law applied. The current 
  EVMs were developed in this pre-ITA-2000 era.  But after October 17, 
  2000, the legal scenario has changed.
  
  
  Section 2(h) of the ITA-2000 states as under:
  
  
  
  "Electronic Form" with reference to information means any information 
  generated, sent, received or stored in media, magnetic, optical, computer 
  memory, micro film, computer generated micro fiche or similar device;
  
  
  
  Section 2(t) of the ITA-2000 states as under:
  
   "Electronic Record" means data, record or data generated, 
   image or sound  stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film 
   or computer generated micro fiche;
  
  
  
  Section 2(l) of the ITA-2000 states as under:
  
  
  
  "Computer System" means a device or collection of devices, including input   
  and output support devices and excluding calculators which are not  
  programmable and capable of being used in conjunction with external files,  
  which contain computer programmes, electronic instructions, input data, and 
  output data, that performs logic, arithmetic, data storage and retrieval, 
  communication control and other functions
 
  
  
  
  The above reading makes it clear that the EVMs can be considered as "Computer 
  Systems" and any document generated by EVMs is an "Electronic Document".
  
  
  ITA-2000 therefore applies to the transactions of the EVMs.
  
  
  On May 10, 2001, the undersigned first made this point through the article 
  Hacking and Indian Elections (
  
  http://www.naavi.org/cl_editorial/edit_01may10_01.html ), where in he had 
  made the following point.
  
  
  Quote:
  The interesting issues to be discussed are, 
  
   "Does the earlier amendments to the People's Representation Act" enabling 
   electronic voting get superseded by the ITA-2000? 
   If there is a dispute on "Rigging" and "Tampering of 
   Voting Machines", can action be taken under Section 66 of the ITA-2000 for 
   "Hacking"? 
   If there is a dispute on the corruption of data due to an 
   induced system error, can it be construed as a "Virus" and action initiated 
   under the ITA-2000? 
   Can "Impersonation" amount to "Unauthorized Access" to the 
   system? 
   ....etc.
   .....
   Before the entire country goes into "Cyber Voting", a 
   thought has to be reserved for the need to educate all the Election officials 
   on "Cyber Laws" and the feasibility of allowing "Voting Through Internet" 
   using a "Valid Digital Signature"...atleast in lieu of "Postal Ballots"
   Unquote
  
  However, neither the EC nor those who are now harping on 
  cancellation of the current election took note of this early warning and 
  started any activity towards sorting out the issues involved.
  In the current design of the EVMs, the names of the 
  candidates and the symbols is fixed on the hardware in written form. The 
  buttons in front of these names are identified by the software as buttons 1 to 
  16 and are internally accounted as votes cast for candidate 1 or 2 etc.
  The voter when he approaches the EVM, is presented a ballot 
  paper which is the front side of the EVM. Then instead of taking a rubber 
  stamp and affixing it in front of the candidate, he instructs the EVM to 
  record his rubber stamp by pressing one of the 16 buttons. When he presses the 
  button 10, he is effectively instructing the EVM, "Please put the rubber stamp 
  for candidate with serial number 10 as I am seeing here".
  However, while the voter is seeing the names as given on 
  the front of the EVM which is a "paper document" the software within the EVM 
  itself (Which is like an agent of the voter for affixing the rubber stamp) is 
  seeing an electronic ballot paper where the names of the candidates are 
  defined by the positions 1 to 16. 
  If the writings on the front of the EVM is changed without 
  proper corrections in the counting logic, there can be possibilities of your 
  electronic agent (i.e. EVM)  affixing the rubber stamp on a wrong 
  candidate. 
  This situation is similar to a person with a parallax error 
  in his vision who stamps line number 6 thinking that he is stamping the line 
  number 5. The only difference is that in the EVM case, the parallax error is 
  that of the electronic agent and not of the principal.
  Some of the mistakes that have been cited in the PIL could 
  have happened because while re using the EVMs, the earlier configuration on 
  the machine might not have been properly wiped out. Hence a button which was 
  earlier meant for BJP may now be linked to the name of a Congress candidate.
  
  This is definitely not acceptable and needs to be 
  corrected. But this is an issue of "Inefficiency" and not of " lack of 
  Integrity" amongst the staff involved.
  Additionally there could be problems in circuitry where the 
  links may be short circuited for some reason and the buttons may behave 
  erratically.
  At present, these issues are being handled through a 
  process of verification before the start of the election process and change of 
  EVMs where necessary.
  Some of the critics have pointed out that these tests can 
  also be made ineffective by an intelligent fraudster. This point is well 
  taken. If a fraudster is determined and he is having access to the machine 
  meant for a particular constituency, he can perhaps manipulate the machines.
  It is in such cases that we need to look at whether there 
  is any legal remedy to punish such culprits and also for the judiciary to 
  review the election process.
  The present practice of configuring the ballot paper 
  partially as a "Written" instrument (as seen by the voter) and partially as 
  "Electronic instrument" (as seen by the software of the EVM) creates a "hybrid 
  " document.
  ITA-2000 speaks of how an electronic document can be 
  authenticated or accepted as equal to a paper document. It does not however 
  speak of how a "hybrid" document can be accepted as a legal document and how 
  it can be authenticated.
  The "authentication" in the ballot process is providing an 
  approval without disclosing the identity of a person through the normal 
  signature. Hence "Digital Signature" cannot be used for authenticating the 
  ballot paper.
  Again if we go back to the manual ballot paper, there used 
  to be a serial number for the ballot paper and the voter used to sign on the 
  counter foil  of the ballot paper. hence, if one takes out a ballot paper 
  after the vote has been cast and checks the counterfoil, it was possible to 
  identify who voted for whom. Hence an indirect linking of the voter identity 
  to the actual ballot has not been considered un acceptable if there are enough 
  safeguards to maintain confidentiality.
  In my opinion, the documents created by the EVM is an 
  "Electronic Document" as per ITA-2000. However, the design of the EVMs as at 
  present make the ballot paper a "hybrid" of "Paper and Electronic" Document. 
  They cannot therefore be properly authenticated (rubber stamped) either by paper based 
  methods or by electronic methods.
  It is in this context that I hold the view that EVMs as 
  being used now are not "Cyber Law Compliant".
  I therefore support the view that there is a need for 
  upgradation of the EVMs which I call as "Making EVMs Cyber Law Compliant".
  I therefore urge EC to take up a review of the system after 
  the current polls.
  I already have solutions for the problems I have stated 
  above and could present them when it is required. In fact, it is being 
  incorporated in a prototype under development by an entrepreneur in Chennai 
  which can be discussed with the EC/BEL.
  I also contend that any manipulation of the EVM is 
  equivalent to "Hacking" under section 66 of ITA-2000. Such "Hacking" also 
  extends to physical destruction of EVMs as we have seen happen in Bihar. The 
  offenders can be charged under Section 66 of the ITA-2000 and the victim can 
  perhaps also claim compensation under Section 43 of ITA-2000.
  Some of the critics of the present system are also holding 
  a strong view that without a "Paper Trail" no ballot would be acceptable with 
  an EVM. This is also the approach adopted by some groups in USA. 
  While having a paper trail could be advantageous, I do feel 
  that it may not be as critical as one seems to think. The US model is almost 
  like printing out every ballot and storing it in a box. This  totally 
  negates the idea of using electronic system except as a means of printing out ballot 
  papers. Either there should be a summary record sufficient to address the 
  concerns of verifiability or a total electronic solution which addresses the 
  issue of verifiability.
  I request my friends who are fighting for the scrapping of 
  EVMs not to consider my comments as an attempt to spoil their objectives at 
  improving the system. This is only an attempt to  help them  achieve 
  their objectives in getting a 
  tamper proof EVM system with a different approach.
  Naavi
  May 03, 2004
  Related Articles:
  
  Hacking and 
  Indian Elections ...Naavi.org
  
  
  Ghosts in the Machine.. Hindustan Times
  
  Cyber 
  Law Compliancy and Electronic Voting...Naavi.org
  
 
 
 
 
   PIL Filed on EVMs in 
Supreme Court..Naavi.org
  
 
 
 
 
   Order Passed on PIL on EVMs..Naavi.org
  
 
  
 
 
Information on EVMs at BEL site
  
 
  
 
 
Information on EVM 
at EC site